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CAPITAL stock without par value, representing share ownership in corporate
enterprise, has been accepted generally as
an improvement in the capitalization procedure of corporations. It has been regarded as a way out of certain difficulties
with which corporations formerly were
confronted.
Sponsors of the idea who urged the initial legislation in New York claimed many
advantages in its favor. The evils of overcapitalization would be obliterated. There
would be no more misleading of the public.
The dollar mark, so frequently deceptive,
would be withdrawn from its important
post, so that it might no longer convey
the wrong idea to the unwary and unsuspecting. No longer would the attention of
investors be diverted from the truth that
a share of common stock of a corporation
represents neither more nor less than a
certain aliquot part of the net value of the
enterprise. Directors would no longer be
called on to place values, both fictitious
and absurd, on such intangibles as patents,
copyrights, goodwill, and the like. There
would no longer be the necessity of resorting to subterfuge in order to have stock,
issued at less than par value, full-paid and
non-assessable. Non-par value stock would
represent a sort of variable quantity,
*A paper read before the first annual meeting of the
American Society of Certified Public Accountants, at Washington, D. C., December 14-15, 1922.
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which would expand and contract automatically in accordance with the changes
in assets and liabilities. The holder of
such stock would be on notice to investigate the value thereof. And it all looked
plausible and simple.
Since 1912, when New York passed the
first law providing for non-par value stock,
twenty-five states have enacted such legislation. Sixteen of these states have made
possible the issue of preferred stock without par value. While there is certain similarity among all the non-par value laws,
there is sufficient difference among them
to render hazardous the satisfactory consideration of any question arising in connection with a given case withoutfirstconsulting the law of the state under which
the corporation affected is organized.
Corporations have not been slow to take
advantage of the non-par value laws, particularly those companies which have had
occasion to do new financing since the war.
Public utilities especially, under the necessity of seeking new capital more or less
continuously, have found in such stock a
means of meeting market conditions for
securities, without the embarrassment of
having to sell stock at an arbitrary par
value less a discount. This is notably true
in cases where a company finds it desirable
to put out both bonds and preferred
shares.
Progress in anyfieldof endeavor is sure
to be attended by a certain amount of friction. Those who experiment must expect
to have some resistance to overcome. It
would be illogical to assume that an innovation like non-par value stock would glide

smoothly into place, overcoming all the
difficulties of the past, without encountering some new obstacles unforeseen.
There appear to be certain breakers
ahead. Some of them will be due to fundamental weaknesses in the laws; others, to
the application of the laws. Involved
litigation, in which accounting will play
an important part, is almost certain to
ensue. Thus it appears that the accountant should anticipate and consider some
of the questions which seem sure to arise,
in order that he may be the more competent to resolve the difficulties when they
develop.
One of the chief difficulties, the cause
of which may be traced to a colossal blunder of the law-makers, seems likely to
grow out of the provision for preferred
capital stock without par value. Because
common stock without par value may be
a good thing it does not follow, ipso facto,
that the same applies to the preferred
class. This thought, however, apparently
did not enter the minds of those framers
of the law who started the trouble in 1919,
in New Hampshire. They seemed to have
argued that what was good for one should
be good for another, and state after state
has blindly followed the bad lead.
Perhaps one of the strongest points of
appeal in connection with the non-par common stock, as it was suggested and first
given consideration, was the fact that it
represented a capital interest remainder
determined by certain assets and liabilities. On first thought it looked like a
measure of freedom from the restraint
previously imposed by the fixed capital
5

account. The net worth would fluctuate
automatically as the assets and liabilities
changed in amount. No distinction between capital and surplus seemed necessary as it all belonged to the stockholder.
Even the existence of a fixed preferred
stock account did not presage any trouble,
because such stock would bear the same
relation in the scheme as the group of liabilities.
Not a few corporations went wrong on
this point, however, by closing out their
surplus to a capital account, only to find
that the lean years of 1920 and 1921 left
them devoid of profits from which to pay
dividends on their preferred stock without
dipping into the common capital account.
One large manufacturing company was
put to no end of inconvenience and considerable expense in order legally to reestablish a surplus account, so that it
might continue dividends on the preferred
stock and maintain the position thereof
as a condition prerequisite to certain financing. Time and experience have corrected the impression which was so naturally received in the early days that a surplus account is unnecessary in the case of
common stock without par value.
Non-par value preferred stock has one
advantage: it may be issued at any price
which the directors deem desirable, unless
the price is in some way restricted by resolution or by-laws, and still be full-paid and
non-assessable. Careful consideration of
the matter fails to disclose any other advantages.
It is conceivable that preferred stock
with this feature may be useful at times
6

in thefinancingof enterprises, but such
occasions appear insignificant when compared with the times non-par common
stock serves a similar purpose. And it
seems doubtful if this advantage of nonpar preferred stock offsets the disadvantages which its issue sets up. The question of redemption equities is immediatelyraised, to say nothing of confusion affecting the sale, transfer, and stock record
keeping subsequent to the original issue
by the company. The latter objection has
been met by placing on the shares a redemption value usually equivalent to what
would otherwise have been the par value.
One issue, however, is out which bears no
reference to the redeemable value.
The practice of issuing preferred stock
without par value and then placing a redemption value thereon not only strikes
one as being somewhat ludicrous, but it
brings up the very serious question of conflict between preferred and common stockholders, particularly as to the legal rights
of the latter. Preferred stock issued under
these circumstances may, in fact, be fullpaid and non-assessable, but it seems
likely that common shareholders will raise
some objection when they realize that
assets belonging to them are to be appropriated to make up the difference between
what preferred shareholders paid for their
stock and the redemption value thereof.
Without a redemption value the liquidation puzzle which would result is apparent.
Illustrative of the opportunities for involvement, there is the following subscription agreement, not at all uncommon with
7

respect to the unit feature, covering both
preferred and common stock without par
value:
"Whereas, Blank and Company, Incorporated,
is a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the State of New Hampshire, with an
authorized capital stock of 300,000 shares, divided
into 50,000 shares of no par value preferred stock
and 250,000 shares of no par value common stock;
and the preferred stock, as and when issued, will
have full voting power, share for share, with the
common stock; and the preferred stock, as and
when issued, shall receive dividends of $8.00 per
share per annum out of the net profits earned
in each fiscal year, before any dividends are paid
on common shares; and the preferred shares participate with the common shares, as if the preferred shares were common shares, after dividends of $8.00 per share have been paid on them
as preferred shares; and both the preferred and
common shares hereby subscribed for are to be
issued fully paid and non-assessable; and it is
mutually agreed that Blank and Company, Incorporated, makes no representations other than
those set forth in its printed prospectus and
literature; and until further notice such of the
capital stock as is to be sold shall be sold in
units consisting of one share of preferred stock
and one share of common stock at $125 per
unit; now, therefore, in consideration of the
representations herein made, I hereby subscribe,
etc."

This agreement, it must be admitted,
has all the ear-marks of a profound and
formal legal document, but it has little
regard for the accounting which must inevitably follow. It accomplishes a complete amalgamation of the two classes of
capital interest, apparently, without any
appreciation of the consequences. Where
is the separation to be made between preferred and common capital? How much
is to be credited to each on the books of
the company? If the preferred is to share
equally with the common in dividends
8

after eight dollars a share have been paid
to the preferred shareholders, may it not
be understood that the preferred stock has
a liquidation interest per share equal to
that of the common? If not, what are the
respective liquidation rights, particularly
of the two hundred thousand common
shares which do not match up with any
shares of preferred?
In another case somewhat similar to the
preceding, two classes of stock, preferred
having a par value of $100 per share and
common without par value, were offered
as units at $110. The selling expenses
per unit were $9.50; the amount realized
per unit, $100.50. The company was desirous that the fifty cents per share should
be considered a premium received on the
preferred stock. The accountants politely,
but firmly, insisted that one hundred dollars should be credited to the preferred
capital account; fifty cents to the common.
But in the case of Blank and Company, Incorporated, there appears to be no basis
for such division, unless, perchance, it
happens to occur to someone to put a redemption value on the preferred shares.
With or without a redemption provision
in the certificates, a joint capital account
appears unavoidable, unless some arbitrary division is made, but it does not
seem possible that merging the two classes
of capital could escape trouble sometime
in the future.
The non-par value laws have already
met with reverses at the hands of the
courts. Such laws of the various states
generally contain a provision that for purposes of taxation shares of stock without
9

par value shall be considered to have some
arbitrary value, usually $100 per share.
In an action brought by the Terminal and
Town Taxi Corporation against the New
York State Tax Commission, Judge Kellogg, of the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, decided on July 6, 1922, as follows:
"The assumption that non-par value stock has
a value of $100 per share for purposes of the
license tax (section 181) is unwarranted, and
the provision that for purposes of the minimum
franchise tax (section 214) non-par value stock
shall be deemed to have a face value of $100
is unconstitutional."

It appears in this case that the Terminal
and Town Taxi Corporation, as plaintiff,
contended for a value of $8.55 per share
on the common stock, instead of $100
per share. The company was a foreign
corporation, doing business within the
State of New York. The authorized capital consisted of 15,000 shares of preferred
stock, par value $100 each, and 23,500
shares of common stock without par value.
Of the preferred stock, only 6,947 shares
at $100 each were issued. The amount
paid in for these shares was $694,700. Of
the common stock, 13,837 shares were
issued, and the amount received therefor
was $117,500, or about $8.55 per share.
Although the total paid-in capitalwasonly
$812,200, the State Tax Commission, in
computing both the license tax and the
minimum franchise tax, used as a basis in
each instance the sum of $2,077,400, or
the aggregate of preferred and common
shares outstanding (20,774) at $100 each.
One of the fallacies, which incidentally
required some time to discover, is that
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corporations having stock without par
value need make no distinction in their
accounting andfinancialstatements as between capital and surplus. It is probably
true that the proprietary interest of stockholders is represented by the excess of
assets over liabilities, but to ignore any
line of demarcation between the paid-in
capital and earned surplus is exceedingly
dangerous from an accounting point of
view. It must probably be admitted that
legally any excess of assets over liabilities
is equivalent to surplus. Many of the
states, however, have written into the law
a provision requiring what is known as
stated capital, which appears to be designed to assure creditors and prospective
creditors, that a certain amount will be at
all times kept in the enterprise as an
amount on which they may rely. Thus, it
appears that while a corporation might
declare and distribute as dividends any
excess of assets over liabilities above the
amount of the stated capital, any encroachment on this sum would render the
corporation or its directors liable for having declared dividends out of capital.
The matter of stated capital is one
which seems quite likely to bring about
litigation in the future, since it seems to
be possible, under the laws of some states,
to pay out as dividends capital actually
contributed, so long as no encroachment
on the stated capital, which may in some
instances be fixed at an absurdly low
figure, takes place. In other words, a corporation may derive a million dollars from
the sale of stock, fix its stated capital at
$500, and, without any earnings, use the
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difference for dividend distributions.
The Ohio law, for example, provides
that the corporation shall state in its certificate the amount of common capital
with which the corporation will carry on
business, which shall not be less than
$500. But even if there should be no need
or desire to resort to such practice for
stock swindling schemes, there is grave
danger of inadvertently encroaching on an
honest and fair stated capital, unless a distinction is maintained between the stated
capital and surplus arising from operations. Few, if any, of the laws make any
attempt to reconcile stated capital with
paid-in capital. There appears to be no
necessity for having the two amounts in
agreement, so long as the corporation in
its certificate specifies the amount with
which it will carry on business.
Again, the law-makers have appeared to
have little conception of corporation accounting, or at least to have taken little
cognizance of the fact that the accounting must record the capital paid
in, and give consideration thereto
in distinguishing between capital and
earned surplus. As previously stated, contributed capital may apparently be diminished by losses without calling on stockholders for the replacement thereof down
to the point where the stated capital becomes impaired. Whether or not, in the
event that stated capital had become impaired, demands might be made on stockholders for sums necessary to restore
such capital is one of the questions
which the future will have to decide.
A new angle to the non-par value stock
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situation exists in the form of stock dividends, which have recently come so much
into vogue. Generally speaking, this action on the part of corporations is regarded as a step in anticipation of federal legislation directed at the taxation of surplus.
The Wall Street Journal, in its columns
of December 7, 1922, while seeming to
question the effect of such legislation,
offers the suggestion that a change in the
form of capital stock of a corporation from
par to non-par would make possible a
means of escape from such legislation
without having to resort to the declaration of a stock dividend.
A part of the article presents the matter
as follows:
"If the next Congress actually proves so hostile
to the accumulation of capital as to levy a tax
on corporate surpluses, there would seem to be
a much simpler remedy at hand than the stock
dividend. For many years issuance of stocks of
no par value has been growing in favor. A corporation whose stock is issued in this form has
no surplus but only an equity in its business
represented by a certain number of shares of
stock. Instead of having, say, 10,000 shares of
stock of $100 par and $2,000,000 surplus a company would have 10,000 shares or no par value
representing a $3,000,000 equity. The book value
of the stock would be the same in each case—
$300 a share—but in the second case the company
would have no surplus to tax."

This harks back to the original idea previously discussed, and which, perhaps,
while sound legally, seems, from an accounting point of view, to have its pitfalls.
Regardless of the merit contained in
such suggestion, events of the past three
or four months will not be denied and
bring into relief a number of corporations,
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some having shares without par value,
which have to face the question of what
to do with the surplus account, assuming
that such account has previously been
maintained, upon declaring stock dividends. If the contention of the Wall
Street Journal were true there could be no
such question, as there would be no dividing line between capital and surplus. Assuming, however, from an accounting
point of view, that this is a fallacious position, the question which looms up is how
much of the earned surplus should be
transferred to the capital account with
declaration of the stock dividend. As to
the propriety of so doing, it seems desirable; otherwise, the amount which would
appear to be available for future cash dividends would be entirely misleading.
The directors, of course, may settle the
question by fixing an amount of surplus
per share to be transferred. If this is not
done the question is probably an open one
depending on the laws of the state in
which the corporation is organized, as
they affect the operations of a corporation
having stock without par value.
If the non-par value shares have a
stated value, as they may have in New
York, the laws of which through alternative provision permit any amount not less
than five dollars, it would appear logical
that the amount to be transferred should
be made up of the number of shares involved in the stock dividend times the
stated value per share. If there is no
stated value per share, an amount per
share as a basis may be found by dividing
the shares outstanding prior to the decla14

ration of the stock dividend into the
amount shown in the capital account and
multiplying by the number of shares in
the stock dividend. In cases where the
stated capital, with which the corporation
under its charter agrees to carry on business, differs from the actual capital shown
by the capital account, it is conceivable,
although somewhat illogical, that the
stated capital might be used as a basis for
determining the amount per share to be
transferred.
There are probably numerous obstacles
in the path of capital stock without par
value which have not been pointed out in
this paper. Doubtless most of the obstacles, known and unknown, will not prove
insurmountable. The whole subject seems
to offer fertile ground for collaboration between lawyers and accountants. It is undoubtedly true that some of the grief
which corporations have experienced in
undertaking to utilize the non-par value
laws might have been eliminated had accountants been consulted before such laws
were placed on the statute books.
In the light of present-day developments
and the marked differences, to say nothing of the inconsistencies, which exist in
the non-par value laws of the various
states, there is perhaps no one matter
which indicates a greater need for federal
legislation than the laws governing organization and operation of corporations.
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